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ABSTRACT: International market dynamics are often cited as the cause of the 
decline in the Australian wine industry’s relative position globally and the 
subsequent declining economic returns to the country’s diverse regions. However, 
this perspective has been derived principally from international trade data. By way of 
providing a more nuanced explanation, we compare Australia’s wine production and 
export performance with that of the 10 largest wine-exporting countries from the 
Southern Hemisphere New World, North American New World and Old World 
(European) wine-producing regions for the pivotal year 2000. The analysis deploys 
three performance measures and one measure for productivity developed specifically 
for this study. The results suggest that these wine exporters occupied a series of 
complex positions with respect to one another. Further, Australia’s situation was at 
the time far from dire. Nevertheless, the comparative position from the perspective of 
performance in 2000 initiated a situation where ‘the hunter became the hunted’. 
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   The global wine industry has long been broadly classified between the so-
called ‘Old World’ (European) and ‘New World’ regions of wine production, 
and the latter has been sub-classified as North America New World and 
Southern Hemisphere New World (SHNW) regions. While it has always 
been an imprecise regional distinction, the classification has had the merit of 
highlighting historical differences and differences based on polarized 
approaches to wine production. The Old World production style has been 
widely viewed as traditional and terroir-based, ‘where geography is more 
important than technology’, while producers in the New World regions have 
been viewed as being more science-based, relying on innovative technologies 
and marketing of fruit-driven wines (DWCADMIN, 2013). 
   The final two decades of the 20
th
 century represent a period when this 
regional classification became less relevant (Robinson, 2006a; 2006b) as 
New World producers challenged Old World producers in the international 
wine market. From the 1980s, Australia led the way in developing what 
Silverman et al. (2001) described as “pioneering wine as a universal first 
choice lifestyle beverage”. Its wine industry eroded the share of the global 
market supplied by the Old World producers and at the same time made an 
increased contribution to the national economy (see, for example, Mounter et 
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al., 2011). Yet, by the turn of the century, the strategy of the Australian wine 
industry had been imitated to varying degrees and at different intervals by 
other SHNW wine-producing countries, notably Argentina, Chile, New 
Zealand and South Africa. 
   The United States of America (USA), a North American New World 
producer, had been a major challenger alongside Australia to the supremacy 
of Old World producers in wine markets in the final two decades of the 20
th
 
century (Morrison and Rabellotti, 2014). But its penetration of export 
markets had been limited by the fragmented nature of the industry, the poor 
image of US wines prior to these decades and a still-developing large 
domestic market (Silverman et al., 2001). 
   As the old century drew to a close, Old World producers had begun to 
respond to the challenge, adopting some of the attributes of the New World 
regions. Robinson (2006a) observed that the regional distinctiveness had 
begun to dissipate as producers in the Old World “increasingly adopt 
technical innovation and those in the New World are increasingly exposed to 
some of the better aspects of tradition”. 
   The extent to which Australia’s former position of dominance over other 
New World wine producers has continued to be eroded is a cause of concern, 
particularly for many regional economies. In this regard inquiries into the 
industry have been undertaken at both federal and state levels of government 
(see, for example, Catanzariti Inquiry, 2010; Murray Inquiry, 2005). The 
industry has also undertaken some attempts at self-regulation (see, for 
example, Grant et al., 2010; Strachan, 2010) and the Australian Bureau of 
Agricultural and Resource Economics (ABARE) has recommended several 
firm-based actions directed at increasing industry competitiveness (see, for 
example, Jackson, et al., 2009; Sheales, et al., 2006). However, the fact 
remains that wine is a truly global commodity where international 
comparison is overwhelmingly dominated by trade data aggregated at the 
scale of national economies or even larger regional blocs (see, for example, 
Anderson and Nelgen, 2010). 
   As economists we are interested in the comparative efficiencies of national 
wine-producing economies. To attempt to examine this in a definitive way 
would be a high bar to set indeed, as it would involve the precise capturing of 
all variables across an irreducibly complex reality into a model with 
omniscient capacity. However, this should not deter us from examining a 
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range of factors that contribute to the comparative performance of wine-
exporting economies. In what we believe is the first attempt of its kind, we 
have developed indicators of comparative performance across wine 
producing economies to produce a more fine-grained analysis of the global 
wine industry than that offered by the usual metrics, in particular trade data. 
To deploy this methodology we have chosen the pivotal year of 2000, when 
Australia had reached the crest of its dominance amongst New World 
producers and when (aggregate national data informs us) ‘the hunter was 
becoming the hunted’ in the sense that other New World producers were 
gaining on Australia’s primus inter pares status.  
   We compare the performance during this pivotal year of six New World 
producers (Australia, New Zealand, Chile, Argentina, South Africa and the 
USA) with the five major Old World producers (France, Germany, Italy, 
Portugal and Spain) using four measures of the transformation of the core 
input – winegrapes – into wine output volume and value. These measures are: 
 
1. Export market penetration index: the transformation of winegrapes 
into wine export volume. 
 
2. Export value proposition index: the ability of exporters to capture 
value from a combination of wine export volume and the perceived 
quality of these exports. 
 
3. Productivity index: A partial productivity index designed to measure 
the transformation of winegrapes into total wine output, taking into 
account the industry servicing both its domestic and export markets.  
 
4. Global value proposition index: the ability of wine producers to 
capture value from a combination of total wine output and the 
perceived quality of this output. A value proposition in the context of 
this study is an affirmation of why a wine buyer should purchase a 
particular wine based on the rationale that this wine will add more 
value to the buyer in the market for which it is destined than would 
any other wine. 
 
   These value measures can be obtained with some strong assumptions that 
enable us to capture perceived product quality as well as volume effects. Data 
The Australian Wine Industry at the Crossroads: a Comparison of              7 




deficiencies also force us to assume that other winery inputs remain constant 
across national industries. Winegrapes are the only input included for 
wineries in our analysis because data sources on other inputs are absent, 
patchy or unreliable to use in estimating productivity fully. Ideally, we would 
like to have estimated total factor productivity rather than partial performance 
measures. Inputs of labour, capital, materials and services used in 
winemaking would have been included had they been available in an 
acceptable form. Further, we have avoided using the term ‘productivity’ for 
the first two and last performance measures because they are strongly 
influenced by factors (such as exchange rate and wine demand shifters) that 
lie outside the influence of the wine industries in sampled countries. 
   In offering explanations as to the comparative position of wine producers in 
2000, this analysis is augmented with accounts of national wine production 
that are grounded in political economy. Data deficiencies are discussed in the 
final section of the article. 
 
2. METHOD AND DATA 
 
   All performance measures were calculated using DPIN3.0 Professional that 
enables productivity to be decomposed into frontier positions (in this case, 
aggregate wine volume and value frontiers) and efficiency scores (technical, 
scale, mix and revenue) (O’Donnell, 2011). O’Donnell (2011) measured 
annual productivity change as the change in total factor productivity (TFP), 
which is the product of the changes in the three efficiency components and 
technical change. He defined technical change by a shift of the production 
frontier, whereas we define performance changes for each of the performance 
measures as a shift of the frontier of the sampled countries for each measure. 
The performance measures computed here (i.e. 1, 2 and 4 in the above list of 
measures) relate to the industry level, as distinct from their common 
interpretation of individual firm efficiency within an industry. An output 
orientation is adopted on the basis that a wine industry aims to produce the 
maximum amount of wine from a given amount of winegrapes. Our third 
measure is indeed productivity, which follows exactly O’Donnell’s 
definition. 
   Technical efficiency is defined as a wine industry producing the maximum 
feasible levels of outputs for specified levels of winegrape inputs, subject to a 
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given wine volume or value frontier. Scale efficiency entails the industry 
operating at the technically optimal productive scale. Mix efficiency requires 
an industry to produce an optimal mix of outputs for a given volume of 
winegrapes after controlling for technical and scale efficiency. Technology is 
measured as the position of the aggregate frontier for the 11 countries in 
either volume or value.  
   Following O’Donnell (2011), revenue efficiency can also be measured as 
the observed revenue obtained by a national wine industry relative to the 
maximum revenue that could be obtained by any wine-producing country for 
given levels of winegrapes used. This study is dominated by revenue 
allocative efficiency effects, which are an amalgam of the endogenously 
determined value of wine arising from its quality (as perceived by buyers) 
and the ability to set exogenously determined output price ratios equal to the 
marginal rates of transformation between outputs. 
   The existence of a large number of wine quality grades means that there are 
numerous individual production possibility frontiers and isorevenue lines of 
different values within each national industry and across the sample of 
countries rather than just one as assumed in the usual revenue-allocative 
efficiency measures. The hybrid isorevenue line for one country therefore 
varies in value from those for other countries, rendering differences in quality 
effects a part of the measurement of revenue inefficiency. Our inability to 
decompose wine into its innumerable and ill-defined quality grades precludes 
the separation of quality effects from the normal allocative efficiency 
measure. But, given the overwhelming importance of perceived quality in 




   The DPIN 3.0 Professional software uses the transitive and multiplicatively 
complete Färe-Primont index. This index enables a multilateral comparison 
of indicators across the 11 countries for the year 2000. Throughout the 
article, for the purpose of making comparisons we set the Australian wine 
industry at an index of unity in the year 2000. 
   Four outputs included in the model comprise three variables of wine export 
volumes and prices, decomposed into bottled still, bulk and bottled sparkling 
wines, and one domestic supply variable measured as revenue. Prices 
expressed in US dollars were deflated using the US GDP deflator and 
expressed in 2000 values. The three export variables used to measure the 
transformation of winegrapes into wine export volumes are bottled still, bulk 
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and bottled sparkling wines. Values were derived using data obtained from 
Anderson and Nelgen (2010). Total domestic wine sales were estimated and 
added as a fourth output variable when measuring the transformation of 
winegrapes into total wine volume and value. The data source for this fourth 
output variable is also Anderson and Nelgen (2010) who compiled all 
required data except domestic wine values for 2000. Domestic supply volume 
was calculated as total output minus export volume from Anderson and 
Nelgen (2010). Given wine is a tradable good in all sampled countries, price 
data were normalized on 2009 prices reported by Anderson and Nelgen 
(2010) using the changes in wine export unit values in each country in each 
year that were then converted to 2000 prices. Revenue from domestic sales 
was obtained as the product of export unit values and the volume of wine 
sold in the domestic market. 
   Input data comprise solely winegrapes in the absence of national data on 
capital, labor, materials and services used in wine production and marketing. 
Anderson and Nelgen (2010) provided data on grape output used for wine 
production for the year 2000. 
 
3. EXPORT STATUS OF NEW WORLD PRODUCERS IN THE YEAR 
2000 
 
   Examining Table 1, Column 2 ‘Revealed comparative advantage’ is 
derived directly from Anderson and Nelgen (2010) (i.e.: as a computation 
derived from aggregate national trade data). However, Columns 3 to 6 
inclusive are calculated as described in section 2 of this article (‘Methods and 
data’). Examining the data from these calculations, several comparisons are 
immediately salient. For example, three SHNW countries stood out from the 
other NW countries in terms of our export market penetration index (column 
3): Australia (1; recalling that for the purpose of this exercise we set the 
Australian wine industry at an index of unity in the year 2000) Chile (1.078) 
and New Zealand (1.243). In commencing our discussion of the results 
presented in Table 1, we firstly examine these three countries in turn before 
moving to examine other salient features of Table 1 with respect to other NW 
producers. Performance differences were found to be dominated by technical 
efficiency sources rather than either scale or mix efficiency sources. 
Therefore, the following discussions of these differences mainly reflect 
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differences in the ability of the wine industry in each country to convert 
winegrapes into output and value, as opposed to effects emanating from the 
scale of industry operations or the mix of wines produced 
 
Table 1. Performance Indices in the Year 2000. 
 













New World:      
Australia 1 1 1 1 1 
Argentina 2.74 0.192 0.243 1.148 0.328 
Chile 14.41 1.078 2.179 0.896 0.990 
New Zealand 3.24 1.243 0.830 1.018 0.871 
South Africa 3.89 0.577 0.805 1.148 0.738 
USA .33 0.429 0.364 1.117 0.750 
Old World:      
France 7.34 1.045 1.115 1.029 0.912 
Germany .30 0.882 0.552 1.051 0.374 
Italy 4.49 0.970 1.134 0.953 0.605 
Portugal 9.20 0.580 0.679 1.034 0.537 
Spain 4.81 1.139 0.907 1.047 0.646 
Sources: Figures for column 2 ‘Revealed comparative advantage’ are derived from Anderson and Nelgen 
(2010, p. 107): ‘Calculated in value terms as the share of a country’s or region’s wine exports in its total 
merchandise exports divided by the share of world wine exports in total world merchandise exports. Thus 
the higher a country’s index is above (below) 1, the stronger its comparative advantage (disadvantage) in 
wine, as revealed from the trade data assuming the government has not distorted producer or consumer 
incentives’ (Anderson and Nelgen 2010, p. xvi). Figures for all other columns have been computed by the 
authors as per ‘Method and Data’ at 2 in this paper. 
Note: Australia’s score for ‘Revealed comparative advantage’ (Column2) is 6.74. Australia = 1.0 for all 
indices. 
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   Ideally we would have liked to describe the wine industry in each country 
in terms of clearly delineated taxonomic categories. However, due to the 
variability of the availability of information across the sample this was not 
possible and a more general description of each of the wine producers and the 






A revealed comparative advantage index of 6.74 indicates that Australia had 
a strong comparative advantage in wine production and export in the year 
2000. Table 1, column 6 demonstrates that Australia had the highest score on 
our global value proposition index, with only Chile (0.99) and France (0.91) 
coming close to matching it, and the fourth highest export value proposition 
index behind Chile (2.179), Italy (1.13) and France (1.12) (Table 1, column 
4). 
   Offering an explanation of these figures we can see that 2000 represents the 
crest of Australia’s wine industry in international markets in a number of 
ways. For example, prior to 1990, Australia’s share of world wine export 
volume was less than 0.5 per cent and its share of world wine export value 
was less than 1 per cent. This ratio indicates that at that time Australian wines 
had a quality premium. In 2000, these shares had grown to 4.9 per cent and 
7.0 per cent, respectively, making Australia the fourth largest wine exporter 
after Italy, France and Spain and the seventh largest wine producer with 3.5 
per cent of world production (Anderson and Nelgen, 2010, pp. 45, 72, 100). 
   The Australian industry’s expansion throughout the 1990s was a rapid 
turnaround from the bleak prognostications of the 1980s, which culminated 
in a federal government-funded vine pull scheme (1985-1987) in response to 
a perceived over-supply on world markets and excessive domestic 
production. This scheme ultimately removed 8 per cent of annual winery 
intake from the national crush (Gow et al., 1991, p. 31). The initial triggers 
for output growth in Australia, as in other New World countries, were (i) 
prospects of export growth as baby boomers moved into the middle-age 
bracket and (ii) the advent of supermarkets as avenues for retail wine sales 
(Anderson, 2010).  
   Australia’s early export progress was assisted by a decline in the value of 
the Australian dollar in the mid-1980s (Anderson, 2000), while a 
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depreciating domestic currency in the latter half of the 1990s helped maintain 
the buoyancy of exports (Sheales et al., 2006). For example, the average 
annual exchange rate for the $A in 1990 was $US0.78. This declined steadily 
to an average of $US 0.55 the period 2000-03, before climbing to $US 1.03 
for the year 2012 (RBA, 2014). A smaller inducement for industry expansion 
arguably came in the form of a four-year accelerated depreciation program 
for grapevine establishment costs introduced by the Australian federal 
government in 1993. However, Australia’s ability to take advantage of the 
export market opportunities and gain ascendency in the United Kingdom 
(UK) and US popular-premium markets emerged from its concentrated 
strategy that was established around developing an innovative culture. This 
strategy was achieved with the support of numerous organizations including 
the Grape and Wine Research and Development Corporation (GWRDC), the 
Winemakers Federation of Australia (WFA), the Australian Wine and 
Brandy Corporation (AWBC), the Australian Wine Export Council (AWEC) 
and the Cooperative Research Centre for Viticulture (CRCV). The GWRDC, 
in particular, was an integral component of the new centralised model with 
the responsibility of establishing priority areas of R&D, which were financed 
by producer levies and matching government funds (Aylward, 2008, pp. 385-
386). In other words, instruments of economic governance were heavily 
entwined with Australia’s export expansion. 
   The targeted innovations were crucial in reconfiguring the structure of the 
industry. For example, the introduction and adoption of new mechanical 
harvesting and pruning practices offset high labour costs – a significant 
production cost not borne to the same extent by other SHNW exporters such 
as Argentina, Chile and South Africa. The restructuring led to a number of 
mergers and acquisitions resulting in critical mass and the realization of 
economies of scale in numerous industry sectors and activities. This industry 
consolidation in turn facilitated the production of large volumes of consistent, 
popular, low-priced premium wine for the UK and US markets (Anderson, 
2010), which together accounted for 70 per cent of Australia’s wine export 
volume in 2000-2001 (Spencer, 2002). Also key to Australia’s export success 
were its marketing activities, both generic and brand, that enhanced 
Australia’s image as ‘a producer of good value-for-money wines’ (Anderson, 
2000). 
   Australia’s strategy earned its industry the reputation of being a ‘high-tech 
producer of technically faultless wine’. However, its success was limited to 
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the popular–premium or ‘commodity’ sector, where the average bottle price 
ranged between $US3 and $US10 (Aylward, 2008, p. 387). This is reflected 
in the figures in Table 1, column 5, where Australia’s productivity index (at 
1) lagged behind all of the other 10 wine producing nations examined except 
Chile in the New World (.896) and Italy in the Old World (.953) and was 
below the mean for both New World producers (1.065) and their counterparts 
in the Old World (1.035). Otherwise stated, the gap between the Australian 
wine industry’s performance and that of its competitors was already 
beginning to show in the critical year of 2000; at least partially due to the 
hardening of its national wine brand as being ‘good value’ rather than resting 




   For even casual observers, the portrait of the Australian wine industry at 
2000 is relatively well-trodden. However, the picture becomes more 
intriguing when we compare it to its rivals based on the performance 
indicators developed for this discussion. In 2000, New Zealand had a 
reasonably strong comparative advantage in wine production and export, 
with a revealed comparative advantage index of 3.24 (Table 1, Column 2) 
even though it was weaker than all but three of the other ten major wine-
exporting countries. Its export value proposition index in 2000 was 83 per 
cent of the Australian index (Table 1, column 4), but its export market 
penetration index was 24 per cent higher than Australia’s index (Table 1, 
column 3).  
   This is explained at least partially by the changing relationship between the 
size of the New Zealand wine industry on the one hand and the volume of the 
national crush on the other. In the period 1991-2000, the New Zealand wine 
industry more than doubled in size, with the total area under wine grape 
cultivation increasing from 5 980 ha to 12 822 ha. The number of wineries 
increased from 150 to 358. Nevertheless, the annual national crush did not 
increase at a commensurate rate, rising from 65 708 tonnes to only 80 100 
tonnes in the same period, with total wine production increasing from 49.9 
million litres to 60.2 million litres. The average yield per hectare actually 
decreased over the same period, from 12.1 to 7.8 tonnes per hectare. This 
attention to quality in grape growing, which may have been accompanied by 
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an increased selectivity for processing, reflected an industry-wide quest for 
producing wines of greater quality, which (in turn) was reflected in an 
increase in price over the same period, with average grape prices per tonne 
rising from $NZ453 to $NZ1,195 (NZW, 2001, p. 3). As for all other NW 
producers except Chile, the productivity index (Table 1, column 5) was 
higher than Australia’s at 2000. 
   At the same time, exports increased markedly from 5.6 million litres to 
19.2 million litres per annum, with the value of exports increasing from 
$NZ25.3 million to $NZ168.6 million. The ratio of exports to production 
increased by almost a factor of 3 during this time, from approximately 11 per 
cent to 32 per cent. While being dominated by white wine (76 per cent) 
export markets were quite diverse, with the UK nevertheless comprising the 
lion’s share (47 per cent) then USA (20.1 per cent), Australia (13 per cent) 
the Netherlands (4 per cent), Canada (3 per cent) and Japan (2.5 per cent) and 
several other countries making up the value of all New Zealand wine exports 
(NZW, 2001, p. 43). 
   In the face of this expansion, domestic consumption remained almost 
constant over the period, registering nominal growth from 14.1 million litres 
to 14.3 million litres, with consumption per capita actually falling from 12.1 
litres to 10.6 litres per annum in the period 1991 to 2000 (NZW, 2001, p. 3). 
This was despite national drinking trends prior to the decade having 
witnessed a marked increase in wine consumption at the expense of beer (and 
a decline in the consumption of fortified wines, from 90 per cent of all wine 
sold in the 1960s to a mere 9 per cent in the mid-1990s (Thompson and 
White, 2000, p. 280)).  
   In 2001, the industry comprised nine regions and was dominated by three: 
Marlborough (at the north-east tip of the South Island) totalling 40 per cent of 
all production; Hawkes Bay (on the east coast of the North Island) totalling 
28 per cent of all production, and Gisborne (just north of Hawkes Bay) 
totalling 15 per cent of all production (NZW, 2001, p. 8). In turn, these three 
regions were each dominated by a specific grape variety. Almost 50 per cent 
of grapes in Marlborough were Sauvignon Blanc; 30 per cent of all grapes in 
Hawkes Bay were Chardonnay (despite over 20 varieties being grown in the 
region) while in Gisborne Chardonnay accounted for over 50 per cent of all 
grapes (NZW, 2001, pp. 17-19). In the same year, white grapes comprised 69 
per cent of the national vineyard area (down from 72 per cent in 2000 and 73 
per cent in 1999) with Chardonnay and Sauvignon Blanc dominating at 41 
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per cent and 35 per cent, respectively (NZW, 2001, p. 10). The 
commensurate national vine area for red wines was, in turn, dominated by 
three varieties: Pinot Noir (41 per cent); Merlot (25 per cent) and Cabernet 




   By 2000, the wine industry in Chile had attained a very high index of 
revealed comparative advantage (14.41), higher than the other SHNW 
producers and over five times the index for the wine industry in neighbouring 
Argentina (Table 1, Column 2). It also scored an export market penetration 
index 8 per cent higher than the Australian year 2000 index (Table 1, column 
3) and an extraordinarily high export value proposition index (2.179) more 
than double the Australian year 2000 index (Table 1, column 4). It was the 
ninth largest wine producer in the world, producing 667 million litres or 2.4 
per cent of world production (Anderson and Nelgen, 2010, pp. 45, 47), and 
the fifth largest wine exporter at 297 million litres of total wine exports, 
which was 4.7 per cent of world export value (Anderson and Nelgen, 2010, 
pp. 72, 87). Forty per cent of exported wine volume went to Western 
European net-importing countries and 34 per cent went to USA and Canada 
over the period 1996-2001 (Anderson and Nelgen, 2010, p. 261). 
   Examining dynamics internal to the Chilean wine industry leading up to 
2000, it is clear that the wine industry reached its exalted global position in a 
comparatively short time frame. For example, the combined effects of 
taxation, prohibition on new plantings and land reform programs were 
detrimental to the wine industry in Chile for much of the 20
th
 century 
(Chadwick, 2003). Further, as recently as the 1970s the value of wine exports 
was negligible (Anderson and Nelgen, 2010, p. 197). However, this situation 
changed when the government adopted an export-oriented development 
strategy based on natural resources from 1979. In 1980, the government 
implemented market liberalization measures and adopted an outward-looking 
economic strategy that set the scene for the expansion and globalization of 
the wine industry (Silverman et al., 2001; Knowles and Sharples, 2002). This 
expansion was around a decade ahead of efforts to boost export production in 
Argentina (discussed below). The first successful exports of wine to Europe 
took place in 1985 (Chadwick, 2003), extending export destinations beyond 
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the traditional Latin American market. Perhaps boosted by the advent of 
democracy, wine exports increased substantially in the early 1990s, attaining 
a mean annual value of exports of $US109 million during the first lustrum 
(five-year period 1990-94) compared with $US13 million a decade earlier. 
Chadwick (2003) has argued that the improved quality of the wines was 
aided by the planting of fruit-driven varietals and the use of modern 
viticultural practices, many instigated by foreign investors (see also Kunc and 
Bas, 2009). 
   The deep decline in wine consumption per capita over the 20
th
 century had 
left the wine industry in Chile with little prospect of a substantial increase in 
domestic consumption into the 21
st
 century. To address this problem, a ‘vent-
for-surplus’ strategy was therefore the only alternative the industry could 
adopt if it was to dispose of its burgeoning wine output. Wines of Chile 
(2011) emphasised the favourable conditions for developing wine exports: 
 
“One of Chile’s greatest strengths is its privileged agro-climatic 
conditions that make it a vitivinicultural paradise. Its 14 distinct 
wine regions that extend 1 200 km (745 mi) from north to south are 
influenced by both the Andes Mountains and the Pacific Ocean and 
vary widely due to geographic diversity, beneficial climates, and a 
wide array of soil types. All of these factors work together to produce 
a broad range of high quality wine varieties and styles that stand out 
in the world of wine.” 
 
Arguably, production costs in grape and wine production were low relative to 
the costs in most other major wine-exporting countries, with the exceptions 




   Argentina had a relatively low index of revealed comparative advantage in 
wine production in 2000, at 2.74 (remembering that 1.0 is neutral between 
comparative advantage and disadvantage) (Table 1, Column 2). In all 
reasonableness this reflects the fact that its drive into export markets began 
later than in other SHNW wine-producing countries. Argentina’s indices of 
export market penetration and export value proposition in 2000 were just 20 
per cent and 24 per cent, respectively, of Australia’s year 2000 index (Table 
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1, columns 3 and 4 respectively). These relatively low indices reflect the 
mixed success in developing the wine industry up until the 1990s. For a 
century from the 1880s, Argentina’s wine industry focussed its strategy 
exclusively on the domestic market and on the production of abundant cheap 
wines, encouraged by government policies (Stein, 2008, pp. 6, 13). Wine-
making equipment became outdated and oenological talents were deficient. 
The contrast between Argentina’s productivity index and the global value 
proposition index (1.148 and 0.338) (Table 1, columns 5 and 6) emphasizes 
this situation. 
   Further, Argentina’s wine industry was unable to escape the decade of 
economic stagnation, debt and recession afflicting Argentina in the 1980s. 
Stein (2008, p. 13) reported that many small- and medium-sized wineries 
could not afford to upgrade their equipment and went out of business; only 
the ‘larger, better capitalized firms’ survived. The focus on the domestic 
market, adverse economic conditions and government regulations that 
impeded the penetration of the global market (Silverman et al., 2001) meant 
that wine exports were trivial until the 1990s: the mean annual export volume 
for the period 1985-1989 was only 17 million litres (Anderson and Nelgen, 
2010, p. 177). 
   Recovery began in the industry in the late 1990s in the wake of the 
deregulation and economic reforms that were initiated by the Menem 
government (1989-99). The removal of restrictions on foreign investment 
facilitated the upgrading of equipment and vine stocks in the vineyards and 
wineries that survived the 1980s, and an overvalued peso made it easier for 
entrepreneurs in the industry to borrow from overseas with the outcome that 
around USD1.5 billion was invested in the industry between 1991 and 2001 
of which only one-third was from local sources (Stein, 2008, p. 15). 
Universia Knowledge@Wharton (2003) and Stein (2008, pp. 7, 12) also 
observed that during this period a process referred to as reconversión happily 
coincided with a period of economic stability that encouraged investors to 
make substantial financial resources available to wineries to upgrade their 
facilities. Aided by long-established vineyards spanning a wide range of 
terroirs, ventures into the wine export market began in earnest in the 1990s, 
particularly in the second half of the decade when the mean annual export 
volume reached 187 million litres according to Anderson and Nelgen (2010, 
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p. 177), a figure more than tenfold the mean annual export volume in 1985-
89. 
   However, the value of wine exports per tonne of grapes produced for wine 
in 2000 was just USD89.77 on the basis of statistics reported by Anderson 
and Nelgen (2010), a fraction of the values for the other SHNW producers. 
Low labour costs by world standards enabled wine producers to keep their 
aggregate costs low (Schrock et al., 2001; Thach and Cuellar, 2010) while 
producing a wide array of wines. Production of a variety of good-quality 
wines at moderate prices enabled the industry to strengthen its competitive 
position in global market during the late 1990s (Stein, 2008, p. 30). 
Nevertheless, by 2000 Argentine wines still had trouble competing on quality 
in wine export markets as the process of upgrading quality had been a ‘slow 
burner’ since the early 1990s. This is reflected in all indices for Argentina in 




   South Africa had a moderately strong comparative advantage in wine 
production and export in 2000, with a revealed comparative advantage index 
of 3.89 (Table 1, Column 2). But its indices of export market penetration and 
export value proposition in 2000 were only 58 per cent and 80 per cent, 
respectively, of Australia’s year 2000 index (Table 1, columns 3 and 4). 
These indices reflect both the severe constraints imposed on the country 
during the apartheid regime and the subsequent and substantial reinvigoration 
of the industry when the sanctions were lifted. 
   For much of the 20th century, the wine industry of South Africa received 
very little attention on the world stage. This was due to two main reasons. 
First, after a period of oversupply and depressed prices, in 1918 the South 
African government-funded the formation of the Koöperatieve Wijnbouwers 
Vereniging van Zuid-Afrika Bpkt (KWV). Although originally proposed and 
designed as a grapegrower co-operative, the KWV soon grew in power and 
prominence to where it set policies and prices for the entire South African 
wine industry. Yields were restricted and minimum prices were set that 
encouraged the production of brandy and fortified wines rather than table 
wines (Robinson, 2006a). Second, its isolation was exacerbated by the 
boycotts of South African products in protest against the country's system of 
apartheid introduced in 1948.  
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   It was not until the early 1990s when apartheid ended and the world’s 
export market opened up that the South African wine industry began to 
transform. Many producers in South Africa quickly adopted new viticultural 
and winemaking technologies with the assistance of international 
winemakers. There were also new plantings of more internationally regarded 
table wine varieties such as Shiraz, Cabernet Sauvignon, Chardonnay and 
Sauvignon Blanc. Much of the new areas were in the cooler Overberg district 
of the Eastern Cape. The reorganization of the powerful KWV co-operative 
into a private business further sparked innovation and improvement in quality 
as vineyard owners and wineries who had previously relied on the price-
fixing structure that bought their excess grapes for distillation were forced to 
become more competitive by shifting their focus to the production of quality 
wine. The KWV quota system was abolished in 1992 (Robinson, 2006a). 
   In 1990, less than a third of all the grapes harvested were used for wine 
production designed for the consumer market, with the remaining two thirds 
being discarded, distilled into brandy or sold as table grapes and juice. 
However, by 2003, the numbers had been reversed with more than 70 per 
cent of the grapes harvested that year reaching the consumer market as wine 
(Robinson, 2006a). Between 1990 and 2000 total red variety plantings 
increased from 16 per cent of total area under vines to 36 per cent; total white 
variety plantings fell from 84 per cent to 64 per cent. Exports grew from less 
than 100 million litres in the 1990s to 138 million litres in 2000, and the 
range of markets expanded. Yet it was not until 1999 that the South African 
Wine Industry Trust was established with a mandate to advance the 
transformation of the industry and to promote exports. Thus, progress was 
slow and there was a residual emphasis on cheap wine for the domestic 
market rather than quality wine for the world market. The difference between 
the productivity index and the global value proposition index (1.15 and 0.74) 




   In 2000, USA had a strong comparative disadvantage in the production and 
export of wine, with a revealed comparative advantage index of just 0.33 
(Table 1, Column 2). Among the world’s main wine-producing countries, 
only Germany had a comparable index (0.30). The US indices of export 
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market penetration and productivity were only 43 per cent and 36 per cent, 
respectively, of Australia’s indices (Table 1, columns 3 and 4). These 
statistics highlight major difference between USA and the SHNW wine-
producing countries in terms of the former’s much larger domestic market 




   As emphasised in the introduction, the analysis undertaken in this article 
represents an initial attempt to provide a basis for the comparison of global 
wine producers other than that relying upon trade aggregated data. To this 
end the article has used four performance measures of the transformation of 
the core input – winegrapes – into wine output volume and value. 
Nevertheless, it would be remiss if we did not note that substantial 
deficiencies persist in the data available to undertake analyses of the type we 
report in this article. Six areas of deficiency stand out. First, a strong caveat 
needs to be made that using national industry-level data does not take 
account of the high degree of heterogeneity among wine-making firms, 
which produce a large range of wine products. We expect the aggregate 
performance trends to hide substantial variations in the competitive positions 
of individual firms at any point in time and in trends over time. 
   Second, winegrapes are the only input included for wineries in our analysis. 
This is because data sources on other inputs are absent, patchy or unreliable 
to use in estimating productivity fully. As such, the study aimed at measuring 
comparative performance rather that the economic concept of productivity. 
Ideally, we would like to have estimated total factor productivity rather than 
partial performance measures. This would have included precise inputs of 
labour, capital, materials and services used in winemaking had they been 
available in an acceptable form. 
   Third, we have excluded vineyards from our analysis, which leaves a gap in 
explaining performance differences, especially since many wineries grow the 
majority of their grapes themselves. There is a need to develop input data for 
wineries and vineyards across all major wine-producing countries derived 
from representative samples. 
   Fourth, there are significant gaps in input prices across the 11-country 
sample that prevented us from conducting an accurate profitability analysis. 
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Such an analysis would have provided a more complete picture of the 
competitiveness of the wine industries under study. 
   Fifth, the estimation of domestic production was based on a strong 
assumption about the relationship between export and domestic prices in 
each country. It would have been desirable to use directly estimated domestic 
wine revenue data. Finally, it would be useful to disaggregate wine products 
by quality, at least to some extent. A starting point would be the 
disaggregation for the year 2009 undertaken by Anderson and Nelgen (2010) 
who distinguished between super premium, commercial premium and non-
premium wines. 
   Nevertheless, the data contained in Table 1 for the pivotal year of 2000 is 
explained by our investigations of particular national industries prior to the 
particular year represented. For example, the dominant position held by 
Australia in terms of total value productivity for 2000 may reflect that it was 
witnessing the benefits of large scale investment in the industry in the 
preceding decade and a flourishing domestic market. Yet this did not accord 
with its comparative position in terms of total volume performance. 
Similarly, New Zealand and Chile enjoyed greater export volume 
performance at the time, but for very different reasons: The former sought to 
increase quality (as demonstrated by the expanding size of the industry not 
being matched by annual crushes increasing at a commensurate rate); the 
latter aggressively pursuing a ‘vent for surplus’ strategy in a variety of 
markets, achieving a high comparative rate of export value productivity 
alongside export volume productivity, but falling short of all other 9 wine 
producing nations in terms of total volume productivity.  
   Further, we have seen that the data for Argentina and South Africa can be 
explained by their belated status at the time, a situation that has altered in the 
ensuing years. Our attention has also been directed principally at the New 
World producers. The data in Table 1 also contains figures representing the 
robust position of some Old World producers – and the weakness of others. 
However, it is the introduction of a new technique in discussing comparative 
international production that we hope will lead to further efforts in this 
direction.  
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